Dead Wake: The Last Crossing of the Lusitania

Erik Larson., “Dead Wake: The Last Crossing of the Lusitania” Crown Publishing, 2015, 353 pp.

Here is an author worth following.  This is the third book of his I have read.  In this instance, Erik Larson has written a centennially non-fiction timely story about an incident that was very important in drawing the US into the WWI conflict: the incident is the German submarine U-20’s sinking of the Lusitania, 12 miles off the southwest coast of Ireland on May 7, 1915.  WWI had begun in August, 1914.   Of the Lusitania’s 1,959 passengers and crew, only 764 survived; total of deaths were 1,198.  Of 33 infants aboard, only 6 survived—the ship went down in 18 minutes, hit by a single torpedo.  Among the dead were 123 Americans of the 189 Americans aboard.   As the tale unfolds, the author switches back and forth from the hunter to the hunted.  We become acquainted with the submarine commander as well as various passengers on the Lusitania.

Historians have long speculated that the Lusitania may well have been abandoned by the British intentionally, hoping the Germans would attack and draw the US into the WWI conflict.  I say ‘intentionally’ because as they would again do during WWII, the British had broken the German code and were well aware of the deadly activities U-20.  Yet, on the other hand, I believe that most people of the time, much like the Lusitania Captain William Thomas Turner, placed tremendous faith in the gentlemanly strictures of warfare that for a century had kept civilian ships safe from attack—gentlemen simply did not intentionally kill civilians.  Additionally, no submarine at 15 knots top speed could match the 25 knot speed the Lusitania could accomplish (note: its top speed at the time of its sinking was only 22 knots as Cunard to save money on fuel only allowed three of the four engines to operate &, in fact, the Lusitania was only going 18 knots when attacked). 

My Notes:

Pg. 323:  The inquiry following the sinking never delved into why the Lusitania wasn’t diverted to the safer North Channel route, and why no naval escort was provided.  Why, given all the information possessed by the Admiralty about U-20; given the Admiralty’s past willingness to provide escorts to inbound ships or divert them away from trouble; given that the ship carried a vital cargo of rifle ammunition and artillery shells; given that Room 40’s intelligence prompted the tracking and protection of the HMS Orison; given that U-20 had sunk three vessels in the Lusitania’s path—the question remains, why was the ship left on its own, with a proven killer of men and ships dead ahead in its path?

Pg. 326:  U-20 only fired one torpedo.  Yet, shortly after the first torpedo struck Lusitania there was a second, more violent explosion.  This has never adequately been explained.  The author states it “most likely was the rupture of a main steam line, carrying steam under extreme pressure. “

Pg. 333:  Germany’s U-Boat campaign waxed and waned, in step with the rising and falling influence of factions within its government that favored and opposed submarine warfare against merchant ships.  Kaiser Wilhelm himself expressed a certain repugnance for attacks on passenger liners.  In February 1916, he told fleet commander Admiral Scheer, “Were I the Captain of a U-boat I would never torpedo a ship if I know that women and children were aboard.”  In June, 1916, the Kaiser issued an order forbidding attacks against all large passenger ships, even those that were obviously British.  Yet, the Lusitania remained a point of conflict with the US.  Particularly after the Zimmerman memo issue came up.

Pg. 336:  Where in May 1915 the Germans had only thirty U-boats, by 1917 it had more than one hundred, many larger and more powerful than U-20 and carrying more torpedoes.  On January 8, 1917 the Kaiser signed an order to allow unrestricted submarine warfare to resume. 

Pg. 338:  The Zimmerman telegram:  Written by Germany’s foreign secretary, Arthur Zimmermann, it instructed Germany’s ambassador in Mexico to offer Mexican president Carranza an alliance, to take effect if the new submarine campaign drew America into the war.  “”Make war together, Make peace together.”  In return, Germany would take measures to help Mexico seize previously held lands in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona.  The telegram was so preposterous that no-one would probably believe it—but Zimmermann admitted he had sent it.  The US declared war on April 6, 1917.

Other Notes:

Pg. 8:  In keeping with Cunard’s custom of naming its ships for ancient lands, the company had selected Lusitania, after a Roman province on the Iberian Peninsula that occupied roughly the same ground as modern-day Portugal.    

                

Although entirely legal under US neutrality laws, the ship was carrying 50 barrels and 94 cases of aluminum powder and 50 cases of bronze powder, both highly flammable under certain conditions, as well as 1,250 cases of shrapnel-laden artillery shells, bound for the British army, and badly needed on the western front, where British forces were having a severe shortage of artillery ammunition 

Larson writes. “Room 40 knew a U-boat was heading south to Liverpool — knew the boat’s history; knew that it was now somewhere in the North Atlantic under orders to sink troop transports and any other British vessel it encountered; and knew as well that the submarine was armed with enough shells and torpedoes to sink a dozen ships. It was like knowing that a particular killer was loose on the streets of London, armed with a particular weapon, and certain to strike in a particular neighborhood within the next few days, the only unknown being exactly when.”