Niall Ferguson, “The Great Degeneration: How Institutions
Decay and Economies Die” Pengu in
Press , 2013, 153 pps
In economic
power and standards of living, the West has dominated other parts of the world
for the past 500 years. This domination
was made possible because of the West’s political (democratic), economic
(Capitalism), legal (The Rule of Law), and social institutions (Civil Society);
institutions that are beginning to deteriorate in the West. As stagnation in the west sets in, the rest
of the world is catching up, particularly countries such as China and India.
Capitalism:
Western institutions used to devote themselves to making it easy for businesses
to start-up. No longer: now complex laws
and regulations send corporations off-shore.
The author argues that financial institutions are not under-regulated—they
are poorly regulated.
Rule
of Law: tort law has allowed civil suits
to choke the legal system. The patent
system and its danger are best illustrated by the pharmaceutical industry. Copyright law is becoming another
disaster. All is best summed up as the
Rule of Lawyers rather than the rule of law.
Civil
Society: Before the government began to
be perceived as a cradle to grave caretaker, most Western citizens freely
donated their time and money to worthy causes and charities, and flocked to
join associations, clubs and organizations that promoted both civic-feeling and
the public good. Now citizens mostly
wait and expect the government to take care of the less fortunate and any and
all public goods.
My Notes:
Pg. 3: There is more going on than the painful
process of debt reduction in the U.S.
Consider: the the US economy created 2.4 million jobs in the three years
beginning in June 2009. In the same
period, 3.3 million Americans were awarded disabled worker benefits. The percentage of working-age Americans
collecting disability insurance has risen from below 3 percent in 1990 to 6
percent. Unemployment is being
concealed—and rendered permanent.
Pg. 4: The crisis of public finance is not uniquely
American. Japan, Greece, Italy, Ireland
and Portugal are also members of the club of countries with public debts in
excess of 100 percent of GDP.
Pg. 10: Adam Smith, in his day, found much to
criticize about China and its stagnation.
This book’s central thesis is that what was true of China in Smith’s day
is true of large parts of the Western world in our time. It is our laws and institutions that are the
problem. The Great Recession (2008 crash)
is merely a symptom of a more profound Great Degeneration.
Pg. 21: Institutions—in the broadest sense of the
term—determine modern historical outcomes, more than natural forces like the
weather, geography or even the incidence of disease. As recently as 300 years ago, the average
Chinese was probably still a bit better off than the average North
American. By 1978, the average American
was at least twenty-two times richer than the average Chinese. History’s great divergence was not just
economic. It was also a divergence in
terms of longevity and health. As
recently as 1960, life expectancy in China was in the low forties, whereas
already in the US it had reached seventy.
Westerners dominated the realm of science, as well as that of popular
culture. The climate, topography and
natural resources of Europe were much the same in 1500 as they had been in
500.
Pg. 26: Francis Fukuyama’s Origins of Political Order defines the three components of a modern
political order as a strong and capable state, the state’s subordination to a
rule of law and government accountability to all citizens. These three components came together for the
first time in Western Europe, with England as the trailblazer.
Pg. 27: It is very tempting to attribute historical
agency to an amalgam of ideas and norms to explain Western domination: Greek philosophy,
the Hebrew Commandments, Roman law, Christ’s ethics, the doctrine of Luther and
Calvin – called something like ‘Judeo-Christian culture.’ But there is a real risk of cherry-picking
here. Terrible Western ideas like, say,
witch-burning or communism never get mentioned, though they seem just as
plausibly the products of Judeo-Christian culture as the spirit of
capitalism.
Pg. 40: US debt as a percentage of
GDP is 112; Italy’s is 128, Ireland 119, and Portugal 124. Japan is the leader at 245. The heart of the matter is the way public
debt allows the current generation of voters to live at the expense of those as
yet too young to vote or as yet unborn. And
making matters much worse, the official debts in the form of bonds do not
include the often far larger unfunded liabilities of welfare schemes like the
American programs of Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security. The best available estimate for the
difference between the net present value of federal government liabilities and
the net present value of future federal revenues is $200 trillion, nearly
thirteen times the debt as stated by the US treasury. (Note: this is leaving out the unfunded
liabilities of state and local governments, which are estimated to be around
$38 trillion). (We have lived well at the expense of our progeny, and have set
them up for failure).
Pg. 51: Had Glass-Steagall still been in force in
2008 and not eliminated in 1999, it would not have prevented the failures of
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers; both were pure investment banks that could
just as easily have been mismanaged to death before 1999.
Pg. 100: Americans could once boast
that their political system set the benchmark for the world; the US was the rule of law. But now what we see is the rule of lawyers, which is something
different. The share of senators who are
lawyers is admittedly below its peak of 51 percent in the early 1970s but it is
still 37 percent. (24 percent in the House).
Pg. 153: It is bad enough to see state capitalism
touted as an economic model by the Chinese Communist Party. But to hear it deployed by the President of
the US in his speech “You didn’t build that” is really disturbing.


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