Yuval Levin, “A Time To Build: From Family and Community
To Congress and the Campus, How Recommitting to our Institutions Can Revive the
American Dream”, Basic Books, 2020, 204 pp.
Yuval Levin, a leading conservative intellectual, argues that Americans must recommit to their failing institutions. "Now is not a time to tear down, but rather to
build, and rebuild by committing ourselves to the institutions around us; from
the military to churches, from families to schools, these institutions provide
the forms and structures we need to be free".
Levin diagnoses our discontent as a consequence of
Americans ceasing to take institutions seriously. American universities, for
example, have three functions: teaching the great ideas of human
civilization; teaching skills that will lead to remunerative employment; and
teaching students how to understand the moral demands of a just society.
However, according to Levin, because the faculties and administrations are sunk in
a malaise of white guilt, they fail to fulfill their duty to uphold the
academic standards necessary to impart great ideas and teach useful skills.
Similarly, legislators have turned over
their duty to shape policy to government agencies while they enact performative
careers as social media celebrities. Judges
are also afflicted, which Levin writes, explains, "A
significant portion of the problem that has traditionally been described as
judicial activism” should be understood as part of this “transformation of
institutions from character-molds to partisan performance platforms.
I found some interesting observations in this book although I believe our community institutions are failing in congruence with the hollowing out of the middle class. Also, notice that the upper-middle-class and above are having no problems with institutions and community.
I found some interesting observations in this book although I believe our community institutions are failing in congruence with the hollowing out of the middle class. Also, notice that the upper-middle-class and above are having no problems with institutions and community.
My Notes:
Pg. 2: Robert
Nisbet wrote in 1975: “Periodically in Western history twilight ages make their
appearance. Processes of decline and
erosion of institutions are more evident than those of genesis and development. Individualism reveals itself less as
achievement and enterprise than as egoism and mere performance.”
Pg. 16: On the
Right, it is maintained that at the core of the crisis of institutions is the
collapse of family and religion, suggesting that our social crisis is a
breakdown of tradition and moral order.
On the Left, it is argued that contemporary capitalism elevates the
interests of the wealthiest above the rest, exacerbating inequality to the
point that it becomes impossible for people to feel and function like equal
parts of a greater whole.
Pg. 22: When we
think about the challenges our society faces, we tend to think about the array
of forces pressing on it—globalization or automation or polarization or
populism or radical individualism or ethnic nationalism. However, our country has seen periods characterized
by vastly more intense kinds of pressure.
What stands out about the current
time is not the strength of the pressures we are under, but the weakness of our
institutions—from the family on up through the national government. That weakness leaves us less able to hold
together against the pressures we do face.
Our age embodies a populism that insists all of our institutions are
rigged against the people with an identity politics that rejects institutional
commitments and conformance to standards, resulting in a celebrity culture that
chafes against all structure and constraint.
Pg. 29f: Gallup
has kept track of Americans’ confidence in various institutions for decades—in
most cases, from 1973 until today. The
trend is unmistakable. From big
business, banks, and the professions to the branches of the federal government,
news media, organized labor, the medical system, public schools, and
higher-education, confidence in our institutions has been falling and
falling. In almost every case, the
decline was gradual at first, then through the 1970s and ‘80s, grew a little
steeper, more so in the 1990s, and then accelerated sharply in the 21st
century.
For instance, in the early 1970s, 80 percent of
Americans told Gallup they had a great deal of confidence in doctors and
hospitals. In 2018, the figure was 36
percent. Forty years ago, 65 percent had
a great deal of confidence in organized religion—this was just 38 percent in
2018; Congress went from 42 percent to 11 percent; the presidency from 52
percent to 30 percent. Only the military
has retained the people’s confidence, remaining at 74 percent.
Pg. 34ff: When we don’t think of our
institutions as formative but as performative—when the presidency
and Congress are just stages for political performance, when a university
becomes a venue for vain virtue signaling, when journalism is indistinguishable
from activism—these institutions become harder to trust. They aren’t really asking for our confidence,
just for our attention. This has led to the gradual replacement of a culture
of integrity with something more like a culture of celebrity—in which achievement is measured by prominence and
legitimacy by affirmation.
Pg. 45ff: The failure
of our American institutions is evident from top to bottom. The most reasonable place to start examining
this failure is with an institution everyone agrees is seriously dysfunctional:
the Congress. To add perspective to this
examination, it is useful to reflect on the founder’s intentions. The Constitution gives Congress powers but
not responsibilities (the author seems to have forgotten ‘the power of the purse’). The president is required to execute the laws,
the courts are required to interpret them.
The assumption was that Congress would run as far and as hard as the
Constitution allowed, so only boundaries were required. It was not anticipated that Congress would
substantially farm-out its responsibilities to an imperial presidency, an
activist judiciary, and administrative agencies.
Pg. 55: Our
presidents, like many members of Congress, now too often see themselves as
outsiders yelling about the government more than insiders wielding its
power. The Trump presidency has made the
problem clearer because Trump, in an unusually explicit way, approaches
politics in performative, theatrical terms, almost always as an outside voice
speaking at, not for, the institutions of the government.
Pg. 69f: The
professions derive their very purpose and significance from their commitment to
deliberate integrity in the work of the people within them. This is particularly true of the lawyer, the
doctor, the nurse, the teacher, and the scientist. What we call professions are distinct from
other occupations precisely because they are somewhat institutionalized. They are characterized by some combination of
formal training (often through professional schools or certifications), a set
of institutional structures of which the profession is the guardian (like
courts, hospitals, schools, churches, or labs), specialized knowledge, some
degree of self-regulation, and an important social purpose that the profession
exists to serve.
Pg. 73: The
crisis of American journalism is especially acute because journalism conveys
information that is only valuable to the degree it is deemed reliable. Confidence
in the news media has plunged from 72 percent in 1976 to 32 percent in 2018. Nontraditional and informal sources of
information have sprouted up everywhere and have applied intense pressure on
traditional journalism. The pressure
from the internet and social media has replaced formative responsible structure
with performance. (We’ve crossed into
the world of ‘alternative facts.’)
Pg. 93: In
2018, the five most common undergraduate majors in America, in descending order
of popularity, were: business, nursing, psychology, biology (including
pre-medicine), and engineering—all of which suggest a fundamentally
professional orientation among these five groups of students.
Pg. 100: Conservatives have clearly long been a
minority of American academics. In
1969, a quarter of American professors described themselves as right of center,
recent surveys have put that figure at one in ten. By some prominent measures Republicans make
up 4% of historians, 3% of sociologists, and a mere 2% of literature
professors.
Pg. 102ff: Today’s
students of all political persuasions are exquisitely sensitive to avoid giving
offense. At the heart of this pressure
is what has come to be called identity
politics which amount to an acute emphasis on group identity and structural
power relationships among different racial, ethnic, sexual, and socioeconomic camps. They all claim to be fighting
oppression. They each have a sense that
they are systematically mistreated—and that, as a result, their experience of
life in America cannot be understood apart from that mistreatment and therefore
that identity. This idea that relations of oppressor and oppressed are at the heart of
social and political life is a long-standing premise of the Left in the West,
while the Right tends to view politics and society through the lens of a
conflict between order and disorder or civilization and barbarism. When controversy arises, discussions take
place on social media with people taking sides and talking past one-another.
Pg. 149: Only
30% of white Evangelicals in 2011 felt an official who commits an immoral act
in their personal life could still behave ethically and fulfill their duties in
their public and professional life; in October, 2016, 72% felt it made little
difference.
Pg. 156f: The
kinds of interpersonal institutions that have helped many Americans to find a
place and make connections have been made less necessary by a variety of
changes in our economic and political order.
We have achieved marked improvements in efficiency by removing human
intermediaries. Automation and the rise
of e-commerce have made it much easier to be a functional loner in
America. Meanwhile, the welfare state
has grown to take on many of the tasks previously performed by family, church,
and civil society. Local civic and
charitable groups, religious institutions, and fraternal organizations simply
have less to do, and therefore fewer ways to attract people out of isolation
and into community.
Pg. 185: Institutions understood as formative are
inherently constraining. They provide
the people in them with boundaries and procedures, a code of behavior,
standards of integrity, and formal responsibilities that help direct their
ambitions and abilities to a broadly shared purpose.
Pg. 190: The
percentage of students at selective colleges whose families are in the top
quarter of income earners in America has gone from 45 percent in 1985 to more
than 65 percent today. Our meritocracy
is plainly rearranging itself into a more familiar aristocratic pattern.
Pg. 198: The recovery of a formative idea of
institutions is essential to the revival of legitimate authority, without which
the future of our free society is at risk.


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