James Piereson “Shattered Consensus: The Rise and Decline of
America’s Postwar Political Order”, Encounter Books, 2015, 358 pp.
What a terrific thought-provoking book. Of particular interest is the section
concerning education at our universities and college. Because I am afraid some readers may forgo my
extensive notes on this book, I have placed this education section out of order
at the top of my note section because of the importance of the subject.
Author James Piereson, president of the William E.
Simon Foundation, senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute is one of the
leading conservative philanthropists in America. His essays appear in many newspapers and
magazines including the Wall Street Journal.
This present book contains many of those past essays going as far back
as 2005 and continuing up to 2015.
In “Shattered
Consensus: The Rise and Decline of America’s Postwar Political Order,” Piereson
argues that America has undergone three profound political transformations in
its history: (1) the Jeffersonian Democratic-expansionist regime from 1800
until 1860, when it dissolved in the midst of the slavery and secession crisis;
(2) a Republican-capitalist regime from 1865 until 1930 when it was brought
down by the Great Depression; (3) and lastly, a Democratic-welfare regime from
1932 until the present, albeit with faltering support during the Regan and
Thatcher years. “In each period, an old
order collapsed and a new one emerged. Today, looking out at our paralyzed and polarized
polity, Piereson argues, we are on the brink of yet another collapse.
My Notes:
Pg. 301: Chapter 17 - 18 “What’s Wrong with Our Universities?”
After reading these chapters I have concluded that one
should avoid any school with a good football team and preferably choose one
with no team, their expenses and spending have little to do with education. And, don’t bother taking courses in
humanities, do this on your own time to obtain better results. (Pursue personal education in humanism through
“The Great Courses” videos, etc.)
In 2014 more than twenty million students will enroll
in the four thousand or so degree-granting colleges and universities now
operating in the US. College tuition and
expenses have grown by five times the rate of inflation over the past three
decades. Ninety percent of colleges and
universities admit any applicant with a high school diploma and the means to
pay. Universities, and not a few
colleges, have layers of highly paid executives presiding over complex empires
that encompass semiprofessional athletic programs, medical and business schools,
and expensive research programs along with the traditional academic departments
charged with providing instruction to undergraduate students. Yet colleges and universities have great
difficulty defining what their enterprise is for. What is a college education? What are students supposed to learn during
their four years on campus?
The central purpose of higher education, and of the
liberal arts in particular, is to turn students into thoughtful and interesting
human beings, but colleges and universities have weighed themselves down with
so many ancillary activities, from technical research to varsity athletics,
that they have lost sight of their basic mission. Seventy percent of all college teaching is performed
by adjuncts, graduate assistants, and other non-faculty personnel (p.
307).
To correct these education problems and lower costs to
affordable levels, it has been proposed to end tenure and sabbaticals for
professors, emphasize teaching over research and publishing in all aspects of
undergraduate education, curb the exploitation of adjunct professors, spin off
university medical schools and research programs, eliminate varsity athletics,
spread resources around to more institutions beyond the ‘Golden Dozen’, reduce
the costs of administration, and take advantage of new technologies to improve
classroom instruction. (p. 310)
Pg. 313: College Learning Assessment (CLA):
The CLA is a standardized test given to more than
three thousand students at different institutions upon entry into college and
then again at the end of their second and fourth years of undergraduate
work. The test asks students to examine
a complex problem, such as an argument in a political campaign about how best
to reduce crime, and then to write up their assessments of different approaches
along with their own recommendations.
The test purports to measure critical thinking and complex reasoning as
well as writing ability.
The results have found that large numbers of students
show little improvement in these skills during their college years. According to this study, 45 percent of the
students showed little evidence of improvement after two years of college and
36 percent showed little improvement after four years. The performance gap between blacks and
whites, already significant upon entry into college, widened further during the
undergraduate years.
The authors of this study locate the sources of these
disappointing outcomes both in the culture of student life and in the lack of
rigor in college curricula. Students
spend the bulk of their time socializing with peers rather than studying,
reading, or discussing academic subjects; students spend on average only about
thirteen hours per week studying (p. 314).
(when I was in school the norm
was two hours study for each credit hour taken each week). The Council for Aid to Higher Education
reports that forty percent of students entering college do not read, write or
perform math at a college-ready level.
It seems that 40 percent of the students going to college are not
prepared for the experience and that faculty and administrators are dumbing
down their curricula to make it possible for these students to pass the
requirements. (p. 315)
Pg. 333: Today,
among the four thousand or so colleges and universities across the country,
Columbia is among the very few (less than 10 percent) that offer a core
curriculum in which students are required to pass through a structured course
of study in the liberal arts. The other 90 percent are much like Harvard and
have what is called a distributional system* (students are given great leeway,
if not total, in choosing their subjects—there is little or no core).
Still, even Columbia has a problem as many senior
professors there are not interested in teaching the Core Curriculum because it
does not contribute to their research interests, leaving many sections to be
taught by junior faculty, graduate students, postdoctoral fellows, and adjunct
teachers. The growing specialization of
academia makes it ever more difficult to recruit the kinds of generalist who
can effectively teach sections of the Core.
(I have found evidence of this problem when sitting on a barstool at the
local pub and trying to engage the person next to me in a conversation, also
this happened once while waiting at a red light).
*Educational Distribution requirements (taken from Wikipedia):
Some colleges opt for the middle ground of the
continuum between specified and unspecified curricula by using a system of
distribution requirements. In such a system, students are required to take
courses in particular fields of learning, but are free to choose specific
courses within those fields.
Other institutions have largely done away with core
requirements in their entirety. Brown University offers the "New
Curriculum," implemented after a student-led reform movement in 1969,
which allows students to take courses without concern for any requirements
except those in their chosen concentrations (majors), plus two writing courses.
In this vein it is certainly possible for students to graduate without taking
college-level science or math courses, or to take only science or math courses.
Amherst College requires that students take one of a list of first-year
seminars, but has no required classes or distribution requirements. Similarly,
Grinnell College requires students to take a First-Year Tutorial in their first
semester, and has no other class or distribution requirements. Others include
Evergreen State College, Hamilton College, and Smith College.
This book references Clinton Rossiter’s 1955
definitions of conservative thinking as concerned with order, tradition, and
authority; and, liberalism as dedicated to equality, democracy, and restless
change. (P. 135). I’m a bit confused as
I believe I am for all of them except “restless change” which I have no
understanding of what it is. In any
event, the author maintains that liberalism is mostly a thing of the past—what
he calls “Leftist” have taken over but still use the name “Liberals.”
Pg. 279: In the
decade or so after 1965, the American university fundamentally changed. The political and cultural upheavals spurred
by the civil rights movement and opposition to the war in Vietnam, combined
with the demographic explosion, brought about a second revolution in higher
education and created an institution that was more egalitarian, more
ideological, and more politicized in its preoccupations, while being less
academically rigorous than was previously the case. It was in this period, from the mid-1960s to
the mid-1970s, that the left university emerged in place of the liberal
university.
In that short period of time, single-sex colleges all
but disappeared; college regulation of student morals disappeared as well;
government regulation of employment expanded, putting pressure on institutions
to hire women and minorities for faculty positions; the line between teaching a
subject matter and advocating political positions was blurred or even
eliminated altogether as the new campus radicalism asserted that all teaching
is political in nature; core curricula were eliminated at most institutions in
favor of ‘open curricula’’ the liberal underpinnings of academic culture—the
freedom to teach and conduct research—were attacked and eroded in the name of
political correctness; the unifying character of the humanities was subverted
and discredited when they were said to represent an oppressive tradition formed
by white European males; new fields, usually with ideological preconceptions,
were created outside the traditional departments and areas of study, thus
expanding the positions available for radical faculty; serious academic
requirements, including foreign language proficiency, were softened or eliminated. Faculty opinion, already skewed in a liberal
direction the 1950s and 1960s, moved decisively to the left.
End of Educations
section
Pg. xiii: A
major theme of this book is that unsettled transitional periods of the kind we
ae now living through have happened before in American history—in the 1850s and
1860s, for example, and later in the 1930s and 1940s. In each period an old order collapsed and a
new one emerged out of an unprecedented crisis, and in each case, the
resolution of the crisis opened u new possibilities for growth and reform.
Pg. xiii:
American capitalism has evolved in distinct chapters, not in cycles or
in an orderly sequence as Marxists or developmental theorists would have
it. The US has had three such chapters
in its history: (1) the Jefferson-Jackson era stretching from 1800 to 1860,
when slavery related territorial issues broke the prevailing consensus apart;
(2) the capitalist-industrial era running from the end of the Civil War to
1930, when the regime collapsed in the midst of the Great Depression; and (3)
the post WWII welfare state that took shape in the 1930s and 1940s and extends
to the present, but is now in the process of breaking up. Each of these regimes accomplished something
important for the US; each era lasted roughly a lifetime; and each was
organized by a dominant political party: the Democrats in the antebellum era,
the Republicans in the industrial era, and the Democrats again in the post WWII
era. The sectional conflict was a crisis
of America’s constitutional system, while the Great Depression was a crisis of
capitalism.
Pg. xv: John
Maynard Keynes argued that the old order of nineteenth-century capitalism had
been destroyed both by the Great War of 1914-18 and by the evolution of capitalism from a system organized around small producers
and local markets to one increasingly dominated by large corporations and labor
unions. Later, during the Great Depression, he worked out the theoretical
argument for government to take a leading role in stabilizing the market
economy with the aim of full employment and maximum output.
Pg. xvi:
Piereson criticizes the recent extremely popular work of Thomas Piketty
“Capital in the Twenty-first Century”
attribution of inequality to something intrinsic to the capitalist order. In fact, Piereson points out, the inequality
of today is more closely linked to specific elements of the postwar regime,
especially in the expansion of global markets and the explosion of asset
prices. From 1980 to 2012 the value of
world stock markets increased from $2 trillion to more the $50 trillion, an
unprecedented development that was bound to produce inequality as one of its
side effects. (Note: I reviewed Piketty’s
book some time ago; also, in the US per capita income increased about sevenfold
from 1945 to the present time: footnote p. 27)
Pg. 3: While
the institutions of government inherited from the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries had been designed to check the power of the state for the purpose of
protecting liberty, Keynes proposed new power to the state in order to promote
stable economic growth and full employment.
Pg. 5: The
Great War of 1914-18 demolished the foundations of European civilization. The old order in Europe had been built upon a
network of interlocking principles and ideals: Protestantism and Victorian
morals in culture; nationalism, empire, and monarchy in politics; laissez-faire
free trade, and the gold standard in economics.
(I think mercantilism belongs in this list!)
Pg. 22: Though
Keynes’s theories were temporarily in retreat during the 1980s and 1990s, they
never really lost currency among academic economists, and the recent financial
crisis provided a new occasion for their application. (Note that Keynes insists that consumption
and debt, rather than thrift and saving, are the keys to prosperity: p. 33).
Pg. 40: The
Keynesian consensus began to come apart in the 1970s when inflation and
unemployment provided openings for conservatives and market-oriented economists
to question the effectiveness of Keynesian policies and point to ‘big
government’ as a cause of the nation’s economic troubles. In that decade both Hayek and Friedman won Nobel
Prizes in economics for work that challenged Keynes’s theories and the
consensus that had formed around them.
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan moved that debate to a higher plane
in the 1980s as they implemented policies to reduce marginal tax rates and free
up the British and American economies from regulatory burdens.
Pg. 53: The New
Deal was erected in an unprecedented calamity with the American economy at a
near standstill. Between 1929 and 1932,
unemployment rose from 3 to 25 percent, national output fell by more than 30
percent, the dollar value of US exports fell by more than two-thirds, the stock
market dropped close to 90 percent, and more than a third of the nation’s banks
failed. No one knew what to do about it,
certainly not FDR who had campaigned on a platform calling for a balanced
budget. (Unemployment remained high,
never going below 14 percent until the nation began to mobilize for war in
1941: p. 56).
Pg. 56: Causes of the Great Depression. Several interconnected factors appear to have
combined to turn a serious stock market correction in late 1929 into a full-scale
depression by 1932: (1) A ill-advised tariff policy passed by Congress in 1930
to protect US manufacturers had the unintended effect of shutting down
international trade and US exports. (2)
A monetary policy adopted by the Federal Reserve raised the discount rate and
allowed the money supply to shrink through 1932 even as the economy
faltered. (3) A cascade of bank failures
wiped out savings and credit for large swaths of the economy. (4) A mountain of international war debt
destabilized exchange rates, undermined the prewar gold standard, and impeded economic
growth in debtor countries. These
factors worked together in a reinforcing process from 1930 to 1933 to send the
world economy into a downward spiral.
Pg. 91: There
are three reasons for thinking that America’s third regime is in the process of
fading out or collapsing: debt, demography, and slowing economic growth,
compounded by political polarization and inertia. Within a decade, these factors may overwhelm
the system of politics under which we have lived since the 1930s.
- From 2001 to 2011, federal spending grew at twice the rate of economic growth. In 2014, the US government spent around $3.8 trillion, of which about one-sixth was borrowed. The national debt (as of 2014) stands at nearly $18 trillion, a sum slightly greater than the nation’s annual gross domestic product.
- The demographic trends now unfolding are likely to make a difficult situation worse. According to the 2010 census there are about 40 million Americans age 65 and over; in 2014 there were about 48 million people drawing benefits from Medicare and about 58 million drawing Social Security benefits of one kind or another. In the future we could easily have between 80 and 90 million people drawing benefits in twelve to fifteen years. This does not include the 66 million or so people now drawing Medicaid.
- On top of all this, there is the problem of slowing economic growth, which is the most fundamental challenge of all. The US needs a rapidly growing economy to produce the wealth to pay for its expensive social programs. If we factor in the recession of 2008 and 2009, GDP grew at a rate of 1.7 percent per year for the whole decade. (During the 1950s and 1960s real GDP grew by an average of 4.3 percent per year).
Pg. 99: From
the late 1930s to the late 1950s, roughly 50 percent of the members of the
House and Senate were ‘moderates’ as measured by their voting records. Today less than 10 percent could be so
described on the liberal-conservative scale.
Pg. 138: A
significant political development in the US over the last half of the twentieth
century was the rise of conservatism to rival liberalism as the nation’s most
influential public doctrine. There are
now more self-described conservatives in America than there are liberals. A Gallup poll conducted in 2013 found that
about 38 percent of Americans classified themselves as ‘conservative’ while
only 23 percent identified as ‘liberal.’
It is especially noteworthy that one would be hard-pressed to identify
an influential book or essay that sets out the principles of contemporary
liberalism as they relate to feminism, multiculturalism, diversity, or economic
planning. A very influential book
putting forth the conservative view, for example, is “The Road to Serfdom” by Hayek (the next book on my to-read list).
Pg. 149:
American conservatism is an unusual movement in the modern world. Its various affiliated groups promoting
liberty and free markets, lower tax rates, religion, traditional morality,
patriotism, and national strength are largely unknown elsewhere in the
world.
Pg. 164:
Liberalism has passed through at least four separate stages and is now
well into the fifth. It first appeared under the banner of
progressivism, which held that new political institutions had to be established
to regulate industrial concentrations and to mediate conflicts between business
and labor. Progressivism flamed out
during WWI but liberalism revived itself during the 1930s in a New Deal
variation, which preserved some themes of progressivism. When New Deal liberalism ran out of steam
because of WWII and the prosperity of the postwar period, liberalism
transformed into a Cold War version, which was more technocratic than its
predecessor but also staunchly anticommunist in foreign policy. It was in this form that liberalism achieved
new peaks of popularity and influence during the Kennedy-Johnson years.
The rebels and protesters of the 1960s authored a
fourth chapter by introducing the theme of liberation on various cultural
fronts. They politicized matters
relating to family life, sexual mores, and religion. Their agenda displaced the traditional
liberal objective of providing economic security for the working man. As liberalism morphed into leftism, it
strengthened its appeal to the educated classes but lost its broad support
among middle and working class voters—the ‘Archie Bunkers.’
The leftist then began to recast the reform ideal,
turning it from an instrument of progress into one of punishment In particular they sought to punish the
wealthy and the middle class for winning success at the expense of higher
ideals or designated victim groups. From
this idea flowed compulsory school busing, race and gender preferences, the
cossetting of criminals who were painted as victims of society, and a legal
culture based upon the idea that every wrong can be remedied by a lawsuit.
Pg. 170:
Today’s agendas of liberalism—environmentalism, feminism, homosexual
marriage, income redistribution—are dissociated from the practical aspirations
of average Americans. The liberal
vanguard once claimed to speak for the middle classes but now it seldom even
pretends to do so. The Democratic Party
has turned into a coalition of ideological liberals, ethnic interest groups,
public sector unions, and beneficiaries of public programs.
Pg. 197: After
Kennedy’s assassination, the character of American liberalism changed from a
doctrine of programmatic reform (think New Deal) with an emphasis on economic
security and national defense, to one of cultural criticism with an emphasis on
liberation from traditional mores.
Pg. 217:
Kennedy proposed in 1962 to cut tax rates across the board by some 30
percent, with the highest rate to be reduced from 91 percent to 65 percent—the
largest tax cut ever proposed. He pushed
for this bill in the belief (later vindicated) that a cut in tax rates would
stimulate economic activity to the point where tax revenues would actually
increase. His tax bill was passed in
1964.
Johnson, in the eighteen months following Kennedy’s
assassination, pushed through the Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act, the
Medicare and Medicaid programs, and countless other pieces of reformist
legislation. Kennedy’s death and
Johnson’s skillful handling of the transition provided the necessary momentum
for these liberal victories. Yet these
legislative successes in 1964 and 1965 turned out to be the high water mark for
post-war liberalism. (p. 243)
Pg. 286: The
main threat facing American power is not from external aggression but rather
from internal fragmentation, polarization, and dissolution. For several decades, the US has been dividing
into hostile political and cultural camps, with the political parties
controlling different states and regions, conservatives and liberals getting
their news from different sources, and Americans dealing on a daily basis only
with like-minded people In the best of worlds,
the university might have evolved as an institution where these different
factions could come together to exchange views and work out their differences
in a spirit of toleration. That has not
happened—and is not likely ever to happen.
The American university has joined the ‘left nation,’ and has
successfully walled itself off from the views of the ‘right nation’ in an
effort to render them illegitimate. By
promoting polarization and fragmentation, the left university is both a symptom
and a cause of the fraying of America’s postwar order.
Pg. 337: Humanism is the name given to the
various intellectual movements that have developed since the Renaissance that emphasize
the secular achievements of man in the fields of art, literature, philosophy,
and politics, using as a starting points and models for study the civilizations
of ancient Greece and Rome. Though
humanism originally developed out of medieval Christianity, its main purpose
then and afterward was to demonstrate the dignity and creative power of
man. The major intellectual movements
that shaped the modern world, including most especially the Renaissance and the
Enlightenment, arose out of humanist ideals.
Reason, science, free inquiry, the power of the human intellect—these have
been the watchwords of humanist movements through the centuries. Humanism—or the humanities—has long found a home
in the great universities of Europe and North America. Until quite recently, the ideals of the
university have been indistinguishable from those of humanism.
Pg. 354:
Beginning around 1980 the Democratic Party gradually turned themselves
into a government party that relies on public employee unions for votes, money,
and organization, and on government spending (along with high taxes) to
maintain cohesion among the party’s various constituent groups. The Democratic Party maintains internal
coherence through government spending and regulation rather than through
principled political appeals.


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