Dan
van der Vat, “The Pacific Campaign: The U.S.-Japanese Naval War
1941-1945”, Simon & Schuster Paperbacks;
(1991) 401 pp.
I have read quite a bit of history concerning WWII,
both in the Pacific and in Europe. I did
not find anything all that new in this book but did find its thorough
presentation of all the facts compiled in one-place concerning the Pacific
worth the read. Many historians feel
this book will be the standard work on the U.S.-Japanese war for years to
come. I was particularly taken with the
ego-mania of leading US military figures: General MacArthur & Admiral King
rate special mention.
Daniel Francis van der Vat (born 28 October 1939,
Alkmaar, North Holland) is a journalist, writer and military historian, with a
focus on naval history. He grew up in
Nazi-German occupied Holland. He
graduated from Durham University in 1960 and has written fourteen books.
My Notes:
Pg. 13: The
Japanese shoguns were displaced in 1868 with the restoration of imperial rule
under the Emperor Meiji. Feudalism was
abolished and Japan made every effort at rapid westernization by setting up a
two-chamber parliament, an independent judiciary, a modern army and navy and
very limited political rights (only 1 percent had the vote at first).
Pg. 21: Pearl
Harbor Dec. 7th 1941: In all,
eighteen U.S. ships were either sunk or badly damaged, including four
battleships on the bottom and four crippled; 164 Navy and Army aircraft were
destroyed and 124 damaged. For this the
Japanese paid with twenty-nine planes destroyed and seventy-four damaged. The Americans reported 2,403 killed and 1,178
wounded, the vast majority from the Navy.
Luckily the Japanese failed to send in the planned third wave of planes to
attack the fuel tanks and other vital shoreside facilities. Their destruction would have rendered the base
useless and forced the US Navy back to the West Coast, over two thousand miles
to the east. The Japanese attack proved
that the age of the aircraft carrier had arrived—all three US carriers were
absent from Pearl Harbor during the attack.
Pg. 24: Ten
hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Philippines were attacked. One hundred US aircraft were knocked out at
Clark, ninety-six of them on the ground.
The Japanese had intended this attack to be simultaneous to the Pearl
Harbor attack so that little resistance would be offered—they did not have to
worry (Macarthur was in command).
Pg. 78: It took
the Germans six weeks to force the French to capitulate on June 21, 1940. The British escaped in “the miracle of
Dunkirk”, but invasion seemed imminent until mid-September 1940, when the Royal
Air Force won the Battle of Britain.
Britain then took on the Italians in the Mediterranean and North
Africa. They won easy victories on land
and sea until Hitler came to the rescue of his Axis partner, sending Rommel
with a corps to Africa, and submarines, E-boats, paratroops and strong air
forces to the Mediterranean.
Pg. 114: After
the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, Churchill was anticipating the US
becoming his active partner, but the US only declared war on Japan. Not to worry: on December 11th Hitler declared
war on the US.
Pg. 157: After
the Doolittle April, 1942 B-25 raid on Tokyo, the Japanese, suspecting Chinese
collaboration in the raid, killed 250,000 Chinese people in reprisal—a worse
atrocity than Nanking.
Pg. 195: After
the June 1942 battle of Midway, the Japanese from now on were to be on the
strategic defensive. The Pacific
Campaign had undergone a mighty sea-change heralding a shift in the balance of
power across the ocean. The numerically
much superior Japanese force had lost four fleet carriers with 225 aircraft and
their pilots plus one heavy cruiser lost and another badly damaged. The Americans lost one carrier, one destroyer
and 113 carrier planes, plus the thirty-three Marine aircraft that failed to return
to Midway.
Pg. 224: One
night on Guadalcanal, an American sentry heard movement and issued the
customary challenge. He was rewarded
with the following unusual reply: “Hold your fire. We are American Marines and wish to report
our evening’s activities.” The sentry
immediately began firing his entire clip, later commenting: “No marine would
talk that way.”
Pg. 237: The
first half of November 1942 was a period of almost undiluted good news for the
Allies. The Americans got the upper hand
in the Solomon’s, Rommel was on the retreat from the British in North Africa
after his defeat at El Alamein, the British captured Madagascar; the Americans
successfully made their landing in North Africa and the British recaptured
Tobruk; and the Russians held the Germans at Stalingrad.
Pg. 248: The defective
US torpedoes on submarines is a senseless tragedy. After continually blaming the submariners for
poor performance, it was finally determined that the torpedoes ran ten feet
deeper than set. Also, the detonators
were defective. Instead of going off a
few feet under the enemy ship’s bottom, as intended, it might detonate as much
as fifty feet short of her side, creating a lovely splash but no damage. These defects persisted until October 1943
(some say all defects were never corrected for the entire war). The torpedoes had never been properly tested in
order to save money.
Pg. 270: The
Japanese failed to learn the lesson from WWI on how important convoys were to
safeguarding shipments of supplies. Any
study of WWI would show how close Germany came to starving out Britain, reduced
to six weeks’ supply of essentials by the spring of 1917, when they finally
awoke to the necessity for mercantile convoys.
The Japanese sent its submarines to sea in 1941 without radar, sonar or
even hydrophones (the passive listening device invented by the British in
WWI). These deficiencies were not fully
remedied until well into the Pacific Campaign.
Pg. 283:
MacArthur claimed credit for the leapfrog or bypass island strategy in
the Pacific. Like most of his claims,
this is also not true. As early as 1940,
the Naval War College proposed a thrust from Hawaii straight at the major
Japanese naval base of Truk, bypassing the Marshall Islands which would
otherwise have been attacked first in a step-by-step progress across the
Pacific. This stratagem was under
serious consideration by the staffs of both Nimitz and Halsey in January
1943.
Pg. 328: Nearly
eight thousand noncombatants on Saipan committed pointless suicide, taking the
total of Japanese who died in vain for Saipan past the thirty-thousand
mark. Saipan was the first loss to the
Allies of territory that had been Japanese before the war and it gave the
Americans an invulnerable base for bombing Japan.
Pg. 400: Over
fifty million died worldwide in WWII, ten times more than in WWI. Two thirds died in Europe and one-third in
Asia. The majority was civilian. Japan lost 2.25 million killed. The US lost 290,000 on all fronts, nearly all
military and naval. The Army lost
234,874, including 52,173 in the Air Corps; the Marines lost more than 18,000,
nearly all in the Pacific. The rest
belonged to the Navy and the Merchant Marine.


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